Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963)

Section 10, 21,23 -- Agreement to sell – Specific performance of -- Clause of damages – Effect of -- It is evident from section 23 of the Act that even where the agreement of sale contains only a provision for payment of damages or liquidated damages in case of breach and does not contain any provision for specific performance, the party in breach cannot contend that in view of specific provision for payment of damages, and in the absence of a provision for specific performance, the court cannot grant specific performance -- But where the provision naming an amount to be paid in case of breach is intended to give to the party in default an option to pay money in lieu of specific performance, then specific performance may not be permissible. Man Kaur (Dead) by Lrs v. Hartar Singh Sangha, 2011(2) L.A.R. 446 (SC).

Section 10, 21,23 -- Agreement to sell – Specific performance of – Clause of damages – Effect of -- Agreement does not specifically provide for specific performance -- Nor does it bar specific performance -- It provides for payment of damages in the event of breach by either party -- Provision for damages in the agreement is not intended to provide the vendor an option of paying money in lieu of specific performance -- Therefore, plaintiff will be entitled to seek specific performance (even in the absence of a specific provision therefor) subject to his proving breach by the defendant and that he was ready and willing to perform his obligation under the contract, in terms of the contract. Man Kaur (Dead) by Lrs v. Hartar Singh Sangha, 2011(2) L.A.R. 446 (SC).

Section 10, 21,23 – Agreement to sell – Specific performance of -- For a plaintiff to seek specific performance of a contract of sale relating to immovable property, and for a court to grant such specific performance, it is not necessary that the contract should contain a specific provision that in the event of breach, the aggrieved party will be entitled to specific performance -- Act makes it clear that if the legal requirements for seeking specific enforcement of a contract are made out, specific performance could be enforced as provided in the Act even in the absence of a specific term for specific performance in the contract. Man Kaur (Dead) by Lrs v. Hartar Singh Sangha, 2011(2) L.A.R. 446 (SC).

Section 16(c) – Agreement to sell -- Suit for specific performance – Pleadings – Evidence -- In a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff should not only plead and prove the terms of the agreement, but should also plead and prove his readiness and willingness to perform his obligations under the contract in terms of the contract. Man Kaur (Dead) by Lrs v. Hartar Singh Sangha, 2011(2) L.A.R. 446 (SC).

Section 16(c) – Agreement to sell -- Suit for specific performance – Pleading -- Evidence of -- To succeed in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove: (a) that a valid agreement of sale was entered by the defendant in his favour and the terms thereof; (b) that the defendant committed breach of the contract; and (c) that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the obligations in terms of the contract. Man Kaur (Dead) by Lrs v. Hartar Singh Sangha, 2011(2) L.A.R. 446 (SC).

Section 16(c) – Agreement to sell -- Suit for specific performance – Ready and willingness to perform – Evidence of – Power of attorney – Witness of – Value of -- If a plaintiff has to prove that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, that is, to perform his obligations in terms of the contract, necessarily he should step into the witness box and give evidence that he has all along been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and subject himself to cross examination on that issue -- A plaintiff cannot obviously examine in his place, his attorney holder who did not have personal knowledge either of the transaction or of his readiness and willingness -- A third party who has no personal knowledge cannot give evidence about such readiness and willingness, even if he is an attorney holder of the person concerned. Man Kaur (Dead) by Lrs v. Hartar Singh Sangha, 2011(2) L.A.R. 446 (SC).

Section 16(c) – Agreement of sell -- Suit for specific performance – Ready and willingness to perform – Evidence of -- Marking the presence of plaintiff in the office of Sub-Registrar on 7.6.1979 was only to save the position of plaintiff -- Correspondence clearly established that plaintiff was not ready and willing to get the sale deed executed within the time prescribed or even as on 7.6.1979 which was the last day of the extended period -- Evidence also demonstrates that plaintiff was not in a position to perform the contract as the purchaser had to purchase the stamp paper and that on 7.6.1979, the stamp paper was not purchased; and that the plaintiff had in his bank account Rs.114000 but that amount was not drawn from the bank -- Such evidence is of no assistance in the absence of evidence as to availability of money for purchase and about the readiness and willingness of plaintiff to perform the contract. Man Kaur (Dead) by Lrs v. Hartar Singh Sangha, 2011(2) L.A.R. 446 (SC).

Section 16(c) – Agreement of sell -- Suit for specific performance – Ready and willingness to perform – Pleadings – Evidence of -- A person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant) is barred from claiming specific performance. Man Kaur (Dead) by Lrs v. Hartar Singh Sangha, 2011(2) L.A.R. 446 (SC).

Section 16(c) – Agreement of sell -- Suit for specific performance – Ready and willingness to perform – Pleadings – Evidence of -- Even assuming that the defendant had committed breach, if the plaintiff fails to aver in the plaint or prove that he was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of contract which are required to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the plaintiff), there is a bar to specific performance in his favour. Man Kaur (Dead) by Lrs v. Hartar Singh Sangha, 2011(2) L.A.R. 446 (SC).

Section 16(c) – Agreement of sell -- Suit for specific performance – Ready and willingness to perform – Pleadings – Evidence of -- Take a case where there is a contract for sale for a consideration of Rs.10 lakhs and earnest money of Rs.1 lakh was paid and the vendor wrongly refuses to execute the sale deed unless the purchaser is ready to pay Rs.15 lakhs. In such a case there is a clear breach by defendant. But in that case, if plaintiff did not have the balance Rs.9 lakhs (and the money required for stamp duty and registration) or the capacity to arrange and pay such money, when the contract had to be performed, the plaintiff will not be entitled to specific performance, even if he proves breach by defendant, as he was not ‘ready and willing’ to perform his obligations. Man Kaur (Dead) by Lrs v. Hartar Singh Sangha, 2011(2) L.A.R. 446 (SC).

Section 16(c) – Suit for specific performance – Ready and willingness to perform – Evidence of – Power of attorney – Witness of – Value of -- Plaintiff neither signed the agreement of sale nor signed the plaint nor gave evidence, in particular, about his readiness and willingness -- Agreement of sale was executed by plaintiff’s attorney holder who was not examined -- Plaint was signed by plaintiff’s other attorney holder (PW1) and who had no personal knowledge of the transaction -- Said attorney holder (PW1) clearly stated in his evidence that he was not aware of anything that transpired prior to power of attorney was executed in his favour -- He did not know whether defendant committed breach nor did he know about the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff – Though there were necessary averments in the plaint about the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff, and though PW1 and PW2 (Property Dealer) gave evidence about his readiness and willingness, the suit has to fail for failure to comply with section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, as there was no acceptable or valid evidence of such readiness and willingness of plaintiff to perform his part of the obligations in terms of the contract. Man Kaur (Dead) by Lrs v. Hartar Singh Sangha, 2011(2) L.A.R. 446 (SC).

Section 20 – Chandigarh (Sale of Sites and Buildings) Rules, 1960, Rule 6 – Public auction – Sale of property -- If it was merely a transaction between private individuals, a mere increase in price may not be a ground to refuse a specific enforcement -- Governing principles between a private individual and a State authority cannot be the same; a fortiorari, the remedy under the private law and public law cannot also be the same -- In State actions, public interest is the most predominant principle. Col. Pirthi Pal Singh Gill and others v. Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh through its Commissioner and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 309 (P&H).

Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Rules, 1964

Rule 12 – Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 5 -- Unauthorised possession on Gram Panchayat land – Sale of -- Right of -- As per provisions of Section 5 of the Act, the Gram Panchayat can dispose of its land as per norms prescribed -- Rule 12 of the Rules shows the condition in which the Gram Panchayat is competent to sell its property – Gram Panchayat is an independent entity and it cannot be forced to sell its land contrary to the provisions of the law. Gram Panchayat Kokalpur v. Joint Director Panchayat, Punjab and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 391 (P&H DB).

Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961)

Section 2(g) -- Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (9 of 1994), Section 85 – Public utility property – Common purposes – usage of -- Vesting of – Gram Panchayat -- Right of -- All the properties which are being used for common purposes or are being used as public utility properties whether part of the Shamlat Deh or not, shall vest in the Gram Panchayat. Sohan Lal and another v. State of Punjab and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 262 (P&H).

Section 7, 11 – Eviction order – Title dispute -- Concurrent finding of the fact that property in dispute is being used for the common purpose for worship, religious festivals and parking for the last so many decades and no material has been placed to prove that the property ever belonged to the petitioners – No document, electricity bill or water connection bill to show their long-standing possession -- Moreover, instead of taking defence in a proceeding u/s 7, petitioners have filed petition u/s 11 of the 1961 Act after the eviction order, which shows malafide on the part of the petitioners – No reason to arrive at contrary view. Sohan Lal and another v. State of Punjab and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 262 (P&H).

Section 7 – Eviction order – Appeal against – Stay of order -- In an appeal against the order of eviction/possession, first appellate authority while admitting the appeal or while issuing notice ordinarily should stay operation and effect of order/decree of eviction/possession. Ram Sarup v. State of Punjab and another, 2011(2) L.A.R. 275 (P&H).

Section 7 – Eviction order – Appeal against – Power of Appellate authority -- Appellate authority was not well within its jurisdiction while rejecting stay application seeking stay of the eviction order on the very first day without assigning any reason while observing reasoned order will be passed in future -- Action of the appellate authority cannot be appreciated and approved, which is totally illegal, unwarranted and amounts to misuse of the jurisdiction vested with the appellate authority. Ram Sarup v. State of Punjab and another, 2011(2) L.A.R. 275 (P&H).

Section 5 -- Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Rules, 1964, Rule 12 – Unauthorised possession on Gram Panchayat land – Sale of -- Right of -- As per provisions of Section 5 of the Act, the Gram Panchayat can dispose of its land as per norms prescribed -- Rule 12 of the Rules shows the condition in which the Gram Panchayat is competent to sell its property – Gram Panchayat is an independent entity and it cannot be forced to sell its land contrary to the provisions of the law. Gram Panchayat Kokalpur v. Joint Director Panchayat, Punjab and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 391 (P&H DB).

Section 11 – Ex-parte order – Review -- Setting aside of an ex parte order does not amount to review -- Commissioner is competent to recall an ex parte order if sufficient ground is made out to do the same. Gram Panchayat Jalalpur v. Director, Rural Development and Panchayats, Punjab and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 402 (P&H DB).

Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 (4 of 1922)

Section 36, 42, 59 – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4,6, 23, 28 – Acquisition of land by trust -- Applicability of Land Acquisition Act – Declaration u/s 42 of the 1922 Act after one year of notification u/s 36 – Contention that declaration u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act can be issued within one year of the notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, therefore declaration u/s 42 of the 1922 Act could not have been issued -- Provisions of the Amendment Act, 1984 are not applicable to the Improvement Act, 1922 except amendments introduced relating to determination and payment of compensation viz Section 23 (2) and 28, as amended by the Amendment Act, 1984, would be applicable to the acquisitions under the State Acts and Section 23 (1A) where the Collector pronounced the Award after 30.04.1982 – Declaration u/s 42 is held to be in accordance with law. Satpal Dhiman son of Shri Jyoti Ram Dhiman v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 407 (P&H DB).

Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (9 of 1994)

Section 20 – Suspension/Removal of Sarpanch – Appeal against – Speaking order -- Appellate authority not adhered to the actual grounds of removal mentioned in the order of the Director based on the report of regular inquiry of ADC -- Real controversy between the parties was not decided – Held, order is non-speaking, appellate authority ought to have discussed the material on record -- Such statutory appellate authority, exercising the powers under the Act, should act independently -- Every action of such authority must be informed by reasons -- Order must be fair, clear, reasonable and in the interest of justice and fair play -- Every order must be confined and structured by rational and relevant material on record because the valuable democratic rights of the parties are involved in the lis. Baldip Pal Singh and another v. Financial Commissioner and Secretary, Punjab Govt. and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 270 (P&H).

Section 20 – Suspension of Sarpanch/Panch – Challenge to -- Enquiry – Right of – Sarpanch/Panch can be placed under suspension during the pendency of the enquiry for the alleged misconduct committed by him – There is no question of keeping him under suspension for the indefinite period – Direction given to initiate and hold the enquiry for the alleged misconduct and to conclude the same after affording opportunity to the petitioner, preferably within four months and if petitioner is not found guilty for the alleged misconduct, suspension order will go -- However, if enquiry is not concluded within four months as directed, impugned orders shall be deemed to have been set aside. Gurjinder Singh v. State of Punjab and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 418 (P&H).

Section 20(4)(g) – Suspension/Removal of Sarpanch – Appeal against – Necessary party – Complainant is necessary party -- In view of the complaint and on the basis of inquiry reports, the Director removed respondent from the post of Sarpanch – Appeal was filed without impleading the complainants as parties – Held, complainants were the aggrieved parties, so the appellate authority slipped into a legal error in accepting the appeal, even without issuing notice to complainant, who were the necessary parties -- Appellate authority ought to have issued notice and provided adequate opportunity of being heard to the complainants before deciding the appeal against them in view of the doctrine of audi alteram partem. Baldip Pal Singh and another v. Financial Commissioner and Secretary, Punjab Govt. and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 270 (P&H).

Section 20(4)(g) – Suspension/Removal of Sarpanch – Appeal – Review application by complainant – Single line order “Review application is not liable to be accepted, therefore, it is dismissed” cannot possibly be termed to be a proper adjudication of rights of the complainants in the appeal -- Contention that review application of complainants was dismissed, so, they would be deemed to be parties in the appeal, is not only devoid of merit but misplaced as well. Baldip Pal Singh and another v. Financial Commissioner and Secretary, Punjab Govt. and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 270 (P&H).

Section 85 – Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 2(g) -- Public utility property – Common purposes – usage of -- Vesting of – Gram Panchayat -- Right of -- All the properties which are being used for common purposes or are being used as public utility properties whether part of the Shamlat Deh or not, shall vest in the Gram Panchayat. Sohan Lal and another v. State of Punjab and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 262 (P&H).

Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (3 of 1911)

Section 121 – Cloths – Dangerously inflammable material -- Cloth being sold are in the nature of cotton, terrylene, synthetic yarn and silk etc. -- Same could not be termed to be dangerously inflammable material.  Vakil Chand Labhu Ram’s case (1992-1) P.L.R. 135, relied. T.V. Dealers Association, Garhshankar and others v. The State of Punjab & another, 2011(2) L.A.R. 265 (P&H).

Section 121 – Dangerously inflammable material -- Inflammable material – Prohibition contained in the statute is regarding “dangerously inflammable material” and not merely “inflammable material. T.V. Dealers Association, Garhshankar and others v. The State of Punjab & another, 2011(2) L.A.R. 265 (P&H).

Section 121 – Electrical or electronic goods -- Dangerously inflammable material -- Inflammable material -- Selling electrical or electronic goods such as TVs and Radios etc. -- Electrical and electronic goods, by no stretch of imagination, would fall within the definition of “dangerously inflammable material” and thus would not come within the mischief of Section 121 of the Act. T.V. Dealers Association, Garhshankar and others v. The State of Punjab & another, 2011(2) L.A.R. 265 (P&H).

Section 121 – Petty retail shopkeepers – Petitioners are petty shopkeepers are not selling their goods in a yard or a depot -- Section 121 extends to dangerously inflammable material, the items/goods come within its ambit only when the same are sold in a yard or a depot -- A yard or a depot denotes a big area in which the goods are stored -- Shops being run by the petitioners cannot be termed as yard or a depot. T.V. Dealers Association, Garhshankar and others v. The State of Punjab & another, 2011(2) L.A.R. 265 (P&H).

Punjab Land Revenue Rules

Rule 15 – Appointment of Lambardar – Service to nation -- Respondent No.5 had served in Indian Army for the period of more than 15 years, he had participated in three wars in the years 1961, 1965 and 1971 and was awarded Shauraya Chakara for his bravery shown at the time of those wars -- Father of the respondent No.5, who was working as a Lambardar and at whose death vacancy had occurred, also served the nation by participating in the war of independence and the second world war -- Brother of the respondent No.5 also served the nation and retired as a Captain from the Indian Army -- Paternal uncle of respondent No.5 also served the Indian National Army -- In view of the service rendered for the nation by the family of respondent No.5, decoration given to him, by appointing him as a Lambardar of the village, is perfectly justified. Tarsem Singh v. Financial Commissioner and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 396 (P&H DB).

Rule 16 – Appointment of Lambardar -- Comparative merits -- Respondent No.3 is 40 years of age, whereas the petitioner is 52 years of age -- Respondent No. 3 has 39 kanals 9 marlas of land and petitioner is having 25 kanals -- Respondent No.3 also has experience as Sarbrah Lambardar, being nephew of the deceased Lambardar -- Other criteria's are by and large comparable – District Collector has taken into account the relevant merit factors while directing appointment of respondent No.3 as Lambardar -- Order passed is perfectly justified -- So far as merits of both the candidates are concerned, in other segments, the respondent No. 3 has an edge. Ranjit Singh v. Financial Commissioner, Animal Husbandry, Punjab and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 399 (P&H DB).

Rule 16 – Appointment of Lambardar -- Unauthorised occupation – Ex-serviceman -- Allegation against the appellant that he was found in unauthorised occupation of the land, which was reserved for a passage during consolidation proceedings – Appellant with a view to remove that evidence, put up earth in the land measuring 1 ft. x 40 ft. -- Merely because the appellant was an Ex-Serviceman, the benefit of appointment cannot be given to him. Ranjit Singh v. Financial Commissioner, Animal Husbandry, Punjab and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 399 (P&H DB).

Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887)

Section 13, 15 – Appointment of Lambardar – Choice of Collector -- Collector's choice, unless it is vitiated in law and on facts, is not to be interfered in the case of appointment of a Lambardar. Ranjit Singh v. Financial Commissioner, Animal Husbandry, Punjab and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 399 (P&H DB).

Section 13, 15 – Appointment of Lambardar -- Choice of Collector -- Collector is the best judge in the case of appointment to the post of a Lambardar, his decision can be interfered with only if it is perverse in law and on facts. Mohinder Singh v. Financial Commissioner, Appeals-II, Punjab and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 416 (P&H DB).

Punjab Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 (25 of 1961)

Section 13(1)(8) – Merger of Societies – Duties of Registrar -- Registrar, Cooperative Societies has to record his satisfaction that it is necessary in the interest of a Cooperative Society or Cooperative Societies – No such satisfaction has been recorded by the Registrar and it is nowhere stated in the order that it is necessary in the interest of the Cooperative Society or Cooperative Societies -- Application of mind should be apparent in the order and the reasons are to be stated as to why it is necessary in the interest of a Cooperative Society or Cooperative Societies -- Yet, not even a formal line has been mentioned in the order that it will be in the interest of Cooperative Societies – Held, order has been passed mechanically and in a stereotype manner – Order, set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Punjab to pass a fresh order, after hearing the necessary parties. Balbir Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 300 (P&H).

Possession as co-owner is deemed to be possession of all

If the defendant is in possession as co-owner, then, legally his possession as co-owner would be deemed to be the possession of all the co-sharers -- A co-owner has an interest in the whole property and also in every part of it -- Possession of property by one co-owner is in the eye of law, possession of all the joint owners even if one co-owner is in joint possession of the same -- Mere occupation of larger portion or even of entire joint property by one co-owner does not necessarily amount to ouster as possession of one co-sharer would be deemed to be on behalf of all the co-sharers -- Passage of time does not extinguish the right of the owner, who is out of possession of the joint property except in the event of complete ouster or abandonment. Lt. Col. Hargobind Singh (Retd.) v. Mr.Hargursharan Singh, 2011(2) L.A.R. 433 (P&H).

Onus of proof

Will – Suspicious circumstances – Where there are suspicious circumstances surrounding the will, the onus heavily lies on the propounder to explain the circumstances to the satisfaction of the court before the court accepts the will as genuine. Rajinder Kaur v. Manjit Kaur and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 440 (P&H).

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894)

Section 4, 6, 11, 48 – Acquisition of land – Release of land – Fraud – Notification u/s 4 and 6 for a public purpose for residential/commercial area -- Land released to respondent no. 3 in 1997 for a specific purpose of setting up a hospital project with a further condition that the land shall not be sold without the approval of the Government and shall be used only for the facilities proposed to be set up – Respondent-DLF entered into a MOU as early as on 21.2.2005, whereas the request for permission to sell the land was made on 31.3.2005/4.4.2005 – DLF-respondent applied for setting up a S.E.Z. on the land on 14.10.2005 and ‘in principle’ approval to set up the aforesaid SEZ was granted by the State even prior to the permission to sell – Permission to set up a SEZ upon the land in favour of respondents-DLF was granted on dated 28.10.2005 and on the other hand, permission to sell land in question was granted to respondent on 28.4.2006 and while granting permission, the State completely ignored the agreement executed by respondent No.3 – Held, aforesaid facts alone are enough to establish the nexus of M/s DLF Limited with the Government to grab the property in question – Subsequent facts of granting necessary approvals for setting up of a SEZ etc. was an attempt to cover the whole malafide action and everything was facilitated to give the same a legal cover – Impugned action of the State cannot be upheld – Notifications releasing the land in favour of respondent no. 3 are set aside and it is further held that permission of sale which was granted on 28.4.2006 in favour of respondent and execution of sale deeds in favour of DLF vide sale deeds were illegal – Since the whole transaction has been found to be the result of fraudulent exercise of power, all the actions are deemed to be vitiated in law – Accordingly, proceedings u/s 4 and 6 shall be revived and the respondent-Authorities shall complete the acquisition proceedings from that stage – Result would be that the respondent-State shall pass an award acquiring the land in dispute. Harkishan v. Union of India and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 371 (P&H DB).

Section 4,6 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Acquisition of land – Delay in challenge – Locus standi -- Power of compulsory acquisition has been used fraudulently, all objections concerning delay in challenging acquisition and locus standi are not sustainable as it is well settled that all actions taken fraudulently are vitiated in law. Harkishan v. Union of India and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 371 (P&H DB).

Section 4,6, 23, 28 – Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 (4 of 1922), Section 36, 42, 59 – Acquisition of land by trust -- Applicability of Land Acquisition Act – Declaration u/s 42 of the 1922 Act after one year of notification u/s 36 – Contention that declaration u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act can be issued within one year of the notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, therefore declaration u/s 42 of the 1922 Act could not have been issued -- Provisions of the Amendment Act, 1984 are not applicable to the Improvement Act, 1922 except amendments introduced relating to determination and payment of compensation viz Section 23 (2) and 28, as amended by the Amendment Act, 1984, would be applicable to the acquisitions under the State Acts and Section 23 (1A) where the Collector pronounced the Award after 30.04.1982 – Declaration u/s 42 is held to be in accordance with law. Satpal Dhiman son of Shri Jyoti Ram Dhiman v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 407 (P&H DB).

Section 4,6, 48 – Acquisition of land – Release of land -- Court cannot ignore the releases/wrongs which has become final and the persons have been benefited immensely on accounts of such wrongs by retaining those benefits illegally and this may have to be undone -- To prevent illegal benefit being retained, the Court may quash release or withdrawal from acquisition if the same is held to be vitiated by fraud -- The Court may require the State to recall such release and also to ascertain whether release was for any extraneous consideration and how wrongful gain or wrongful loss can be readjusted -- Released land may be restored to the State or sold in public auction -- State itself may recall its illegal actions -- It may not be possible to lay down any rigid rule as to how relief can be moulded by Court in an individual fact situation -- If order of release is to be cancelled, it may be necessary to hear the affected party by the Court or the authority passing the order. Harkishan v. Union of India and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 371 (P&H DB).

Section 4,6,10 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Acquisition of land -- Writ jurisdiction – Limitation -- Writ petition filed 16 years after the award was announced by the Collector, must fail -- It is trite law that delay and laches is one of the important factors which the High Court must bear in mind while exercising discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution -- High Court must refuse to invoke its extra-ordinary jurisdiction and grant relief to the writ petitioner. Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Chennai v. M. Meiyappan & Ors., 2011(2) L.A.R. 284 (SC).

Section 4,6,10 – Constitution of India, Article 32, 226 – Acquisition of land -- Writ jurisdiction – Limitation – In relation to the land acquisition proceedings, the Court should be loathe to encourage stale litigation as the same might hinder projects of public importance – Courts are expected to be very cautious and circumspect about exercising their discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution if there has been inordinate unexplained delay in questioning the validity of acquisition of land. Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Chennai v. M. Meiyappan & Ors., 2011(2) L.A.R. 284 (SC).

Section 48 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 226 -- Release of land -- No merit in the contention that there is absolute power of the State or that exercise of discretion by the State cannot be interfered with in exercise of its power of judicial review -- Court can certainly see that the executive acts lawfully, bona fide and within the limits of its power -- If there is an abuse or misuse of power, jurisdiction of this Court can certainly be invoked -- Rule of law has to prevail as it the basic requirement of Article 14 that the State acts fairly, reasonably and in good faith. Harkishan v. Union of India and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 371 (P&H DB).

Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977 (13 of 1977)

Section 15 -- Oustees claim – Allotment of plot -- Decision to restrict allotment of a plot to an oustee in a sector in which his land was acquired, was given go-bye through a policy dated 28.8.1998 – Sometimes the land acquired was for the purpose other than residential, through this policy, a provision was made for allotment of a plot in the next residential sector, which may be floated by HUDA -- Action of HUDA to deny allotment on the ground that the plot is not available in the sector where land is acquired may not be justified in the policy and the reason behind issuing this policy -- This reasoning would equally apply to all the cases under consideration even before this policy came into being. Sandeep v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 327 (P&H).

Section 15 -- Oustees claim – Allotment of plot -- Policies required of HUDA authority to invite the claim of the oustess separately before floating of sector -- HUDA was required to consider and allow such claims even prior to floating the scheme or at any rate allot these plots to oustees before working out availability of plots for floating the same for general public -- Applications for allotment of the plots were invited from the general public, there were no separate claims invited either through newspaper or press from the oustees – Held, it is clear violation of the policies by the HUDA as framed from time to time -- Government and its instrumentality can not ignore or fail to follow polices formulated and such policies would have binding effect on them -- Claim from the oustees was to be separately invited and could not have been clubbed or joined with the general category -- HUDA directed to allot the residential plot to the petitioner as per his entitlement. Sandeep v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 327 (P&H).

Section 15 -- Oustees claim – Allotment of plot -- Land acquired in 1983 – Claim was filed on 21.8.2000 for allotment of plot under oustees quota alongwith 10% amount of the total price of the plot -- Claim was rejected on the ground that his claim could be considered only for allotment in a sector for which his land was acquired -- Another reason given is that he had delayed too long in making the present approach – Held, responsibility to invite claim of the oustees as per the policy started from 1987 was that of the HUDA -- Not only that respondents were under obligation to invite such applications before floating the sector for general public but it was to be done separately -- Further the respondents were also first required to satisfy the claim of the oustees before even floating the sector – Ground of denial is in violation of the policies -- Direction issued to the HUDA to consider the claim of the petitioner for allotment of a plot under the Oustees quota in the sector in which his land was acquired, if no plot is available in the said sector, the claim shall be considered and satisfied in any of the sectors that may now be under consideration, but in the city of Gurgaon – HUDA can be asked to consider the claim in any of the sectors which may be floated in future. Sandeep v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 327 (P&H).

Section 15 -- Oustees claim – Delay – Allotment of plot -- In the absence of claims having been invited in proper and appropriate form as per the policy the order rejecting claim may not be sustainable -- Delay cannot be considered fatal -- In such like cases, it will be appropriate to issue some general directions to HUDA to invite claim of all the oustees by issuing a general advertisement in this regard either through press/New-Paper or publication -- Form and sufficient time should be given to the oustees to submit their claim -- As per the schemes, claims of such oustees, who have either not applied or have applied or their claim are under consideration can be so considered, if the plots are still available in Sector for which their land was acquired and if any oustee cannot be adjusted in the sector, then his claim can also be considered for allotment of a plot in any of the adjoining sectors. Sandeep v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 327 (P&H).

Section 15 – Allotment of plot -- Oustees claim – Co-owner – Right of -- Pleas that all the co-sharers would be only entitled to one plot in terms of a policy instruction issued in the year 1993 may be in violation of law laid down by the Full Bench in Jarnail Singh’s case, CWP No.2575 of 2009, decided on 1.10.2010 -- Notification for acquisition was issued on 20.8.1992 -- It would be legally appropriate to direct that each co-sharer is entitled to allotment of a plot individually and the right could not be restricted to allotment of one plot for all the co-sharers. Sandeep v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 327 (P&H).

Section 15 – Allotment of plot -- Oustees claim – Consideration in general category – Effect of -- Petitioner is entitled to consider for allotment of a plot in reserved category of oustees -- Action of the respondents in treating him in the category of general for consideration for allotment is legally not sustainable and is not proper -- Oustees are a distinct class and cannot be clubbed with general policies of allotment of plot -- Direction issued to the HUDA to consider the claim of the petitioner in the reserved category of oustees. Sandeep v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 327 (P&H).

Section 15 – Allotment of plot -- Oustees claim – Earnest money – Non-deposit of -- Policy instructions issued on 12.3.1993 -- Oustees claims were rejected on the ground that they had not deposited 10% of the earnest money as was required under the policy -- Estate Officer concerned is to invite the claims through press/News-Papers for allotment of plots under the oustees policy much before floating of Sector -- Then each of the applicant is required to send his application in the prescribed proforma along with the supporting documents and earnest money equivalent to 10% of the cost -- HUDA had not followed the policy to invite claims from oustees separately through press or news-papers -- Claim of the oustees was invited while floating the scheme for allotment of plots in the sector for all eligible persons -- Inviting claim of oustees along with general public is in violation of the policy – Right of the petitioner for consideration for allotment of plot in oustees quota, thus cannot be forfeited on the ground that he had not earlier made application along with cost of 10% -- Direction is issued to HUDA to consider the claims of the petitioners in the reserved category of oustees. Sandeep v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 327 (P&H).

Section 15 – Allotment of plot -- Oustees claim – Delay in applying – Effect of -- Land was acquired on 27.08.1987 -- Petitioner ultimately has filed a claim on 26.5.2009 along with 10% cost of the plot as earnest money – Claim of the petitioner is being declined only on the ground that the acquisition was prior to 10.9.1987 and as such is not covered by the policy instructions issued on the said date – Policy instructions were issued on 27.3.2000 providing that the claim of all the oustees be considered irrespective of date of acquisition in case the plots are still available for allotment -- Even the oustees have prior right of allotment and after satisfying their claim only the plots would be allotted to other persons – Some plots are still available -- Accordingly, the case is made out for issuing direction to the respondents to consider the claim of the petitioners under the category of oustees in accordance with above noted scheme and plots be accordingly allotted to the petitioners as per their entitlement. Sandeep v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 327 (P&H).

Section 15 – Allotment of plot -- Oustees claim – Policies for oustees claim -- Oustees are to be treated as a separate class and their claim can not be considered, alongwith the claim of general public -- Claims of oustees are to be invited by Estate Officer, HUDA before sector is floated -- Policy required of HUDA to invite claim of the oustees separately before floating any Sector -- In fact land losers have option to buy first before applications are invited from the general public -- Claim of allotment of a plot to general public would arise after satisfying the claim of the oustees who have first option to buy -- Once the claim of oustees is invited alongwith general public, the possibility of first satisfying the claim of the oustees would stand defeated -- That is why oustees have been held to be separate and distinct class -- It is because of this that HUDA is required to invite claims of oustees before floating of the Sector. Sandeep v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 327 (P&H).

Section 15 – Allotment of plot -- Oustees claim – Policies for oustees claim – Earnest money – Deposit of -- Concept of -- Requirement of depositing 10% of the price would arise only if the claims are first invited as per the policies and it has to be through press or news paper -- Price, as per the policy instructions dated 12.3.1993, is to be deposited once the claim is finally accepted by the competent authority and when the sector scheme is floated – In order to set the position right and as one time measure, it is appropriate to direct HUDA to invite claims of all the oustees through an advertisement in the newspaper, giving them sufficient time to make applications -- Those who make applications pursuant to such an advertisement may be asked to deposit 10% of the price, if the plots are still available -- Their claims be considered in the light of the policies formulated by HUDA -- Plots be allotted to such applicants in the Sector for which their land was acquired, if such plots are available in the said Sector or in the adjoining Sector in the terms of the policy and if the plots are still available -- This aspect is made as a one time measure so as to satisfy the claims of those left over either because of ignorance or because of act of HUDA not following the policies in letter and spirit -- HUDA was to keep the claims in a live register which has not been done -- HUDA was to demand 10% price which it has failed to do -- Course as suggested is thus the only fair and appropriate method to set the wrong right. Sandeep v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 327 (P&H).

Evidence by Power of attorney

Law summarized -- (a) An attorney holder who has signed the plaint and instituted the suit, but has no personal knowledge of the transaction can only give formal evidence about the validity of the power of attorney and the filing of the suit -- (b) If the attorney holder has done any act or handled any transactions, in pursuance of the power of attorney granted by the principal, he may be examined as a witness to prove those acts or transactions -- If the attorney holder alone has personal knowledge of such acts and transactions and not the principal, the attorney holder shall be examined, if those acts and transactions have to be proved -- (c) The attorney holder cannot depose or give evidence in place of his principal for the acts done by the principal or transactions or dealings of the principal, of which principal alone has personal knowledge -- (d) Where the principal at no point of time had personally handled or dealt with or participated in the transaction and has no personal knowledge of the transaction, and where the entire transaction has been handled by an attorney holder, necessarily the attorney holder alone can give evidence in regard to the transaction -- This frequently happens in case of principals carrying on business through authorized managers/attorney holders or persons residing abroad managing their affairs through their attorney holders -- (e) Where the entire transaction has been conducted through a particular attorney holder, the principal has to examine that attorney holder to prove the transaction, and not a different or subsequent attorney holder -- (f) Where different attorney holders had dealt with the matter at different stages of the transaction, if evidence has to be led as to what transpired at those different stages, all the attorney holders will have to be examined -- (g) Where the law requires or contemplated the plaintiff or other party to a proceeding, to establish or prove something with reference to his ‘state of mind’ or ‘conduct’, normally the person concerned alone has to give evidence and not an attorney holder -- A landlord who seeks eviction of his tenant, on the ground of his ‘bona fide’ need and a purchaser seeking specific performance who has to show his ‘readiness and willingness’ fall under this category -- There is however a recognized exception to this requirement -- Where all the affairs of a party are completely managed, transacted and looked after by an attorney (who may happen to be a close family member), it may be possible to accept the evidence of such attorney even with reference to bona fides or ‘readiness and willingness’ -- Examples of such attorney holders are a husband/wife exclusively managing the affairs of his/her spouse, a son/daughter exclusively managing the affairs of an old and infirm parent, a father/mother exclusively managing the affairs of a son/daughter living abroad. Man Kaur (Dead) by Lrs v. Hartar Singh Sangha, 2011(2) L.A.R. 446 (SC).

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949)

Section 13 – Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 (27 of 1952) -- Three storeyed building over 10 Marla plot is permissible -- Mere fact that only ground floor was constructed at the time of letting out the premises to the tenant, will not be sufficient to infer that the landlord has granted right to use terrace as well -- Tenant does not have any right over the terrace of the ground floor on a building which admits construction of three floors -- Tenant is restrained from interfering in the enjoyment of the first and second floors of the building with all amenities. Smt. Vinit Khera v. Sewa Singh, 2011(2) L.A.R. 277 (P&H).

Section 13(3)(a)(i) – Bonafide need – Presumption of -- Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide, rather, Rent Controller must proceed on the presumption that requirement is bona fide. Rajinder Parshad v. Rajinder Kaur, 2011(2) L.A.R. 290 (P&H).

Section 13(3)(a)(i) – Bonafide need – Need of the landlady is genuine and bona fide to establish the coaching classes for the increase of monthly income of the husband after his retirement -- It is not open to the tenant to say that there is open place where new construction can be raised to start coaching class -- Suitability of the accommodation as per the requirement of the landlady is a personal decision of the landlady which cannot be said to be wrong by the tenant or Rent Controller. Rajinder Parshad v. Rajinder Kaur, 2011(2) L.A.R. 290 (P&H).

Section 13(3)(a)(i) – Bonafide need – Every landlord has every right to increase the income neither tenant not Rent Controller can dictate that landlady should feel satisfied on the pension being received by the husband of the landlady. Rajinder Parshad v. Rajinder Kaur, 2011(2) L.A.R. 290 (P&H).

Section 13(3)(a)(i) – Bonafide need – Sale of property – Effect of -- Merely because certain properties were sold by the landlady, when husband of the landlady was in service, will not make landlady disentitled to seek eviction of the tenant to start coaching classes after the retirement of the husband of the landlady. Rajinder Parshad v. Rajinder Kaur, 2011(2) L.A.R. 290 (P&H).

Section 13-B, 18-A – Constitution of India, Article 14 -- N.R.I. Landlord – Applicability of Punjab Act to Chandigarh by notification – Validity of -- Section 13-B providing for special right in favour of landlords under the category of Non-resident Indians -- Classification of Non-resident Indians, as a separate class of landlords, cannot be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution -- Right to seek eviction on the ground of bonafide need is available to all landlords, only difference in the case of NRIs and certain other specified landlords is that right to contest eviction proceedings is governed by special procedure of requirement of obtaining leave to defend by making out a case under Section 18A of the Act -- Classification is not shown to be irrational -- Same has rational relationship with the object sought to be achieved i.e. providing speedy remedy to non-residents in bonafide need of premises let out to tenants -- Validity of impugned notification, extending the Punjab Act to Union Territory, Chandigarh, upheld. Asha Chawla & others v. Union of India & others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 420 (P&H DB).

Section 13(2)(i) – Arrears of rent -- Assessment of provisional rent – Denial of relationship of landlord-tenant – Effect of -- If relationship of landlord-tenant is denied by the tenant, then the Rent Controller is not supposed to assess the rent and to give an opportunity to the tenant to tender the rent -- Tenant first of all took false plea that he has paid entire amount of rent without any receipt and thereafter, himself denied the relationship of landlord–tenant between the parties and deposited lesser amount in the Court, which makes him defaulter and liable to be evicted. S.K. Kalia v. Om Parkash and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 427 (P&H).

Section 13(2)(iii) – Impair materially the value and utility of building -- Both the Courts below have recorded finding that tenant has converted a temporary structure of Barsati into a pucca room – Contention of landlord Barsati (temporary structure) was made on the roof for the purpose of keeping cots and drying the clothes and by converting it into a room without the consent of the landlords, there would be hardly any place to dry clothes and to keep cots and necessary heavyweight is put on the walls of the structure, which has not only diminished the value of the property, but has also caused danger to the load bearing walls of the construction – There is force in the argument of the landlords – Eviction order upheld. S.K. Kalia v. Om Parkash and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 427 (P&H).

Section 13 – Eviction petition – Question of Jurisdiction -- Undisputedly question of jurisdiction was not dealt with either by Rent Controller or by the Appellate Authority – Matter remanded Back to Rent Controller to frame issue of jurisdiction and to decide it on merits after hearing both the parties. Jai Bai v. Gurdas Singh, 2011(2) L.A.R. 430 (P&H).

East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (50 of 1948)

Section 18 – Passage – Right of -- Appellants are in unauthorised occupation of the land reserved for a passage during the consolidation proceedings -- Contention that the appellants are also members of Jumla Mushtarka Maalkaan, who are entered as owners in Jamabandi of the land in dispute and as such they cannot be ejected from that land – Held, the consolidation authorities have the power to reserve land for common purposes in a village by imposing a pro rata cut upon the right holders -- As per provisions of Section 23-A, the land so reserved shall be under the ownership of the Jumla Mushtarka Maalkaan – Therefore, contention deserves to be rejected. Raghbir Singh and others v. Collector, Bhiwani and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 394 (P&H DB).

Section 18, 23-A – Public purpose – Unauthorised occupation -- Right of -- During consolidation proceedings, land in dispute was kept reserved for a public purpose i.e. ‘latrines’ -- Appellant amalgamated the said part of the land of the Gram Panchayat in his house -- Nothing on record to show that house of the appellant was in existence before the year 1950 -- Appellant is a law breaker – Contention that the appellant’s only house exist in the land in dispute as such, it was incumbent for the authorities below to declare him owner of the same is liable to be rejected. Gurmail Singh v. Director and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 405 (P&H DB).

Co-owner

Possession as co-owner is deemed to be possession of all -- If the defendant is in possession as co-owner, then, legally his possession as co-owner would be deemed to be the possession of all the co-sharers -- A co-owner has an interest in the whole property and also in every part of it -- Possession of property by one co-owner is in the eye of law, possession of all the joint owners even if one co-owner is in joint possession of the same -- Mere occupation of larger portion or even of entire joint property by one co-owner does not necessarily amount to ouster as possession of one co-sharer would be deemed to be on behalf of all the co-sharers -- Passage of time does not extinguish the right of the owner, who is out of possession of the joint property except in the event of complete ouster or abandonment. Lt. Col. Hargobind Singh (Retd.) v. Mr.Hargursharan Singh, 2011(2) L.A.R. 433 (P&H).

Constitution of India

Article 14 -- East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13-B, 18-A – N.R.I. Landlord – Applicability of Punjab Act to Chandigarh by notification – Validity of -- Section 13-B providing for special right in favour of landlords under the category of Non-resident Indians -- Classification of Non-resident Indians, as a separate class of landlords, cannot be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution -- Right to seek eviction on the ground of bonafide need is available to all landlords, only difference in the case of NRIs and certain other specified landlords is that right to contest eviction proceedings is governed by special procedure of requirement of obtaining leave to defend by making out a case under Section 18A of the Act -- Classification is not shown to be irrational -- Same has rational relationship with the object sought to be achieved i.e. providing speedy remedy to non-residents in bonafide need of premises let out to tenants -- Validity of impugned notification, extending the Punjab Act to Union Territory, Chandigarh, upheld. Asha Chawla & others v. Union of India & others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 420 (P&H DB).

Article 14, 226 -- Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 48 – Release of land -- No merit in the contention that there is absolute power of the State or that exercise of discretion by the State cannot be interfered with in exercise of its power of judicial review -- Court can certainly see that the executive acts lawfully, bona fide and within the limits of its power -- If there is an abuse or misuse of power, jurisdiction of this Court can certainly be invoked -- Rule of law has to prevail as it the basic requirement of Article 14 that the State acts fairly, reasonably and in good faith. Harkishan v. Union of India and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 371 (P&H DB).

Article 226 – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4,6,10 – Acquisition of land -- Writ jurisdiction – Limitation -- Writ petition filed 16 years after the award was announced by the Collector, must fail -- It is trite law that delay and laches is one of the important factors which the High Court must bear in mind while exercising discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution -- High Court must refuse to invoke its extra-ordinary jurisdiction and grant relief to the writ petitioner. Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Chennai v. M. Meiyappan & Ors., 2011(2) L.A.R. 284 (SC).

Article 226 – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4,6 – Acquisition of land – Delay in challenge – Locus standi -- Power of compulsory acquisition has been used fraudulently, all objections concerning delay in challenging acquisition and locus standi are not sustainable as it is well settled that all actions taken fraudulently are vitiated in law. Harkishan v. Union of India and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 371 (P&H DB).

Article 32, 226 – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4,6,10 – Acquisition of land -- Writ jurisdiction – Limitation – In relation to the land acquisition proceedings, the Court should be loathe to encourage stale litigation as the same might hinder projects of public importance – Courts are expected to be very cautious and circumspect about exercising their discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution if there has been inordinate unexplained delay in questioning the validity of acquisition of land. Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Chennai v. M. Meiyappan & Ors., 2011(2) L.A.R. 284 (SC).

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908)

Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint -- Whether family settlement requires registration or admissible (or otherwise) in evidence or whether it is forged document, would be the moot points to be finally decided by the trial Court on the basis of evidence brought on record by the parties in order to substantiate their respective stands -- Objections/issues raised by the defendant in the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, can only be decided on the basis of evidence brought on record by the parties and not otherwise -- Plaint can only be rejected if it squarely falls within the ambit and four corners of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC and not otherwise – Trail court rejected application – Revision against trial court order dismissed. Lt. Col. Hargobind Singh (Retd.) v. Mr.Hargursharan Singh, 2011(2) L.A.R. 433 (P&H).

Order 7, Rule 11 (c) – Deficit Court fees -- Whenever the plaint is not properly stamped, the Court shall give one opportunity to the plaintiff to supply the requisite stamp paper and the plaint can be rejected only if the plaintiff fails to do so. Jarnail Singh v. Sanjiv Kumar, 2011(2) L.A.R. 424 (P&H).

Order 7, Rule 11 (c) – Deficit Court fees -- Plaintiff moved application with the plaint for seeking time to pay the court fee and the trial court passed order requiring the plaintiff to make good the court fee on the next date fixed and the plaintiff accordingly complied with the order and paid the court fee -- Consequently Order 7 Rule 11 (c) CPC was duly complied with and therefore, there was no occasion for rejecting the plaint or for dismissing the suit as time barred. Jarnail Singh v. Sanjiv Kumar, 2011(2) L.A.R. 424 (P&H).

Chandigarh (Sale of Sites and Buildings) Rules, 1960

Rule 6 – Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 (27 of 1952), Section 8-A -- Show cause notice -- A show cause notice is not necessarily an inviolable principle; It is unnecessary when the party knows that he has not obtained a vested right in the subject matter. Col. Pirthi Pal Singh Gill and others v. Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh through its Commissioner and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 309 (P&H).

Rule 6 – Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 (27 of 1952), Section 8-A -- Public auction – Setting aside of -- Show cause notice – Requirement of -- If there had been an outright sale of the property and the person, who conducts the auction was himself competent to conclude the contract and a contract had been concluded/confirmed, a decision to annul the contract could not be made without giving a notice to the person to explain the same and to take a decision of the basis on such objections. Col. Pirthi Pal Singh Gill and others v. Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh through its Commissioner and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 309 (P&H).

Rule 6 – Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 (27 of 1952), Section 8-A -- Public auction – Setting aside of -- Show cause notice – Requirement of -- Where an auction is subject to a confirmation by another authority, a person that bids at the auction ought to know that by the mere fact that he has made the highest bid does not conclude the contract and if a decision is taken by yet another officer not to confirm the sale, such a decision need not be put to the party before a decision is taken -- It is not the same thing as to state that a sanctioning authority may take an arbitrary decision -- Validity of such a decision will still be a subject to judicial review. Col. Pirthi Pal Singh Gill and others v. Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh through its Commissioner and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 309 (P&H).

Rule 6 – Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 (27 of 1952), Section 8-A -- Public auction – Setting aside of -- Show cause notice – Requirement of -- If, the auction had been set aside attributing any practice of fraud or collusion against any of the petitioners, they would be justified in stating that decision without putting them on notice of such decision was illegal -- Auction is being set aside on existence of some supervening events that had a bearing on the unjustness of the result of the auction in which the petitioners had themselves no part -- Loss of property is itself not the prejudice -- Prejudice shall be to show how the notice would have made a difference. Col. Pirthi Pal Singh Gill and others v. Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh through its Commissioner and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 309 (P&H).

Rule 6 – Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 (27 of 1952), Section 8-A -- Show cause notice -- Detailed procedure to show cause notice before a resumption was made, it is in the context of how a person, who obtains an allotment and who comes upon the property, is made to vacate the property and such a decision, which will have an immediate effect on a right to hold on to possession, could not be made without a transparent process that involves the affected party to show cause as to why the extreme action shall not be taken. Col. Pirthi Pal Singh Gill and others v. Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh through its Commissioner and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 309 (P&H).

Rule 6 – Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 (27 of 1952), Section 8-A -- Public auction – Higher bid in a week -- If there was an offer within a week by yet another person for a price above what was offered in this case for the property, it only showed that it would have been prudent to keep back the property from sale without offering it for public when the market forces were pulling the prices down. Col. Pirthi Pal Singh Gill and others v. Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh through its Commissioner and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 309 (P&H).

Rule 6 – Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 (27 of 1952), Section 8-A -- Public auction – Setting aside of – Auction purchasers have not invested any big sums -- Their deposits were in terms of a few lakhs and they have not had the benefit of possession all the years -- If the sales were allowed to stand, the private individuals would come to enormous benefit that would benefit only them -- If, on the other hand, the sales were to be set aside, it would make possible for realisation of over Rs.50 crores for the property by Administration – Setting aside of auction upheld, auction purchaser would be entitled to refund of their moneys with interest @24% per annum. Col. Pirthi Pal Singh Gill and others v. Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh through its Commissioner and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 309 (P&H).

Rule 6 – Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 (27 of 1952), Section 8-A -- Public auction – Setting aside of -- Sales had not been approved and sale deeds had not been executed in the manner contemplated in the Rules -- Consideration for the property had not been paid in full – Auction purchaser had not taken possession and the property had not been put to use by the petitioners -- It is not a case where the auction purchasers had to close down business by the action of the Administration – Auction purchaser could no more than complain of loss of hypothetical profits, if the property had been sold, if the property had been delivered possession, if the property had been put to use for the business, if profits had accrued and a host of imponderables – Auction sale shall be cancelled. Col. Pirthi Pal Singh Gill and others v. Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh through its Commissioner and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 309 (P&H).

Rule 6 – Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 20 – Public auction – Sale of property -- If it was merely a transaction between private individuals, a mere increase in price may not be a ground to refuse a specific enforcement -- Governing principles between a private individual and a State authority cannot be the same; a fortiorari, the remedy under the private law and public law cannot also be the same -- In State actions, public interest is the most predominant principle. Col. Pirthi Pal Singh Gill and others v. Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh through its Commissioner and others, 2011(2) L.A.R. 309 (P&H).