Doctrine of Estoppels

Doctrine of Estoppels

Petitioner raised a considered and conscious plea that he is a tenant of the Gram Panchayat on payment of 15% per annum as 'Chakota' (rent) -- Petitioner, obtained an injunction, on the basis of this plea of tenancy -- Petitioner is barred by the doctrine of estoppels from raising of plea of ownership. Harnek Singh v. Joint Development Commissioner, Punjab and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 407 (P&H).

Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (44 of 1954)

Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (44 of 1954)

Section 19, 20 – Allotment/Transfer/Alienate of evacuee land – Power of – Asstt. Settlement Officer (S)-cum-Managing Officer decided to transfer the land in favour of the petitioner -- Since transfer was ordered for part of the property sought to be transferred, petitioner preferred an appeal before the Settlement Commissioner seeking transfer of entire land – During the pendency of the appeal, Deputy Secretary, Government of Punjab ordered to transfer the disputed land in favour of respondent – Held, under the Act only Asstt. Settlement Officer-cum-Managing Officer has jurisdiction to alienate/transfer/allot the agricultural evacuee land -- Once a competent officer had already directed to transfer the land, State Govt. or its Secretary has no jurisdiction to transfer the evacuee agriculture land under the Act -- Direction issued by Deputy Secretary is without jurisdiction. Kartar Chand v. Financial Commissioner, Appeal, Punjab and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 127 (P&H).

Section 33 -- Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955, Rule 117 – Allotment of land – Cancellation of – Purchase of excess land – Non-payment of – Notice – Requirement of -- On the reference made by the Tehsildar (Sales), the allotment of excess land was cancelled by the Chief Settlement Commissioner -- In regard to excess land measuring 2.15 standard acres by the Secretary Rehabilitation, the allottee was allowed to purchase the excess land at the rate fixed by the department -- Neither the allottee nor his Lr’s moved any application for purchasing the excess land nor amount was deposited nor any steps were taken to get the same transferred in their name -- They slept over the matter for more than 30 years -- In that eventuality, it cannot possibly be saith that the allotment of excess land was cancelled, without issuing any notice -- On the other hand, it was the allottee, who had waived his right of purchase of land in pursuance of order. Sukhwant Singh and others v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 640 (P&H).

Declaration of Municipal Corporation

Declaration of Municipal Corporation

Haryana Municipal Corporation Act -- Financial Commissioner issued guidelines/criteria for constitution or abolition of any Municipal Corporation in the State -- According to the criteria the population of that area should not be less than 3 lacs; density of the said population should be 400 persons per square kilometer for such census town; the income of the municipal corporation should be sufficient enough to meet out their own establishment charges for salary, provident fund share, pension, gratuity of its employees and other local and mandatory obligations like audit fees, repayment of loans contracted by them etc. and the expenditure on these heads should not be more than 80% of the total income of the municipality -- Guidelines further provides that the residents of Gram Panchayat / Municipal Committee who want to constitute a Municipal Corporation, the Municipality/ Gram Panchayat should pass a resolution to the effect followed by the recommendation of the concerned Divisional Commissioner -- In case the Municipality/ Gram Panchayat does not pass such resolution either in favour or against then the Divisional Commissioner should give his clear cut findings with reasons for constitution of Municipal Corporation in the area -- There is no compliance with these guidelines -- Declaration of the Corporation could be said to be illegal when viewed in the light of these guidelines, which were framed by the Government itself. V.K. Kapoor and others v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 524 (P&H DB).

Haryana Municipal Corporation Act -- For declaring the Municipal Corporation, Section 3 (2) of the 1994 Act required that the Municipality could be declared as Municipal Corporation if its population exceeds 3 lacs. V.K. Kapoor and others v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 524 (P&H DB).

Haryana Municipal Corporation Act -- Gram Panchayat area -- Before the area of Gram Panchayat is included in the Municipal Corporation, the Government by way of official Gazette will have to make a specific notification declaring that this rural area shall be ceased to be the part of the Gram Panchayat. V.K. Kapoor and others v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 524 (P&H DB).

Haryana Municipal Corporation Act -- In the absence of assessment by the authorities, regarding the involvement of 60% of the population of the area in non agricultural activities, such an area could not be added in the Municipal Corporation. V.K. Kapoor and others v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 524 (P&H DB).

Haryana Municipal Corporation Act -- Notification issued to declare the Panchkula Municipal Council as Municipal Corporation after merging Municipal Committees of Pinjore and Kalka and certain villages – (a) The State Government before issuing such notification did not call for any objection by the individuals, councils, institutions or societies of the area or Panchayats or Municipal Committees, (b) Nothing was mentioned; if the cantonment area or the forest area was excluded from its operation. The Municipal Councils were not consulted for altering or adding the area within their respective municipal limits. (c) No draft notification was issued and two notifications by the State Government and the Governor were, directly issued for creation and declaring the Municipal Corporation consisting of the area as referred to in the notification, (d) Though, the area of Gram Panchayats was added, yet, no specific notification for dissolving of the gram panchayats was issued. (e) The notification issued by the Governor of Haryana does not record his subjective satisfaction as to whether it satisfied the guidelines issued by the Government and is in consonance with the provisions of Haryana Municipal Act, 1973, Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 and Article 246(Q) of the Constitution – Held, to declare certain municipal area as 'Municipal Corporation' is the legislative act, however, no such act could be done in contravention of the laws of the State and procedure as laid down under Section 2-A of the 1973 Act as well as Section 3 (2)(3) of the 1994 Act -- The legislature never intended to give a go bye these provisions while creating a Municipal Corporation by upgrading Municipal Committee and Municipal Council – Notifications are in clear cut contravention of 73rd and 74th amendment of the Constitution so also the guidelines as well as the aforesaid provisions of the 1973 Act and the 1994 Act, therefore, the same are quashed. V.K. Kapoor and others v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 524 (P&H DB).

Haryana Municipal Corporation Act -- Objections – Right of -- Doctrine of natural justice -- Not only 42 Sarpanches of Gram Panchayats are losing their offices and period of their remaining tenure would remain in abeyance -- Developmental work would be stopped -- Similarly, municipal council and three municipal committees would lose their tenure of office before it is completed -- Constitution of Municipal Corporation would result in imposition of more and higher taxes casting additional financial burden on the inhabitants of the area, therefore, it was the requirement of the natural justice and fair play that the population of the Municipal Council and the Committees would have been heard and their objections should have been decided. V.K. Kapoor and others v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 524 (P&H DB).

Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 -- Gram Panchayat area – Inclusion of 42 Gram Panchayats to declare the Municipal Corporation is, in fact, against the intent of the Constitution itself -- Article 243 (Q) provides for transitional area i.e. from rural to urban area, therefore, the first step for taking the rural area into urban area is by constituting Nagar Panchayat -- State of Haryana, has defined urban area as Municipal Committee – For the purpose of 73rd as well as 74th amendment in the Constitution was to bring maximum participation of the people in the local self government by the rural or semi urban population -- State instead of decentralizing the powers is amalgamating the same in the hands of a few which body would certainly not take so close care which the smaller bodies were doing -- The purpose to introduce the 73rd and 74th amendment was that once the village attains the character which is more urban in nature then the said rural area is to be put in to transitional area i.e. in the present case as a Municipal Committee and the urban character of the said rural area is to be seen from last preceding census wherein non agricultural activities, revenue generated in the local administration etc. are determined -- It is only after a period and after seeing the population of that particular area on the basis of last preceding census that the transitional area is given the second step of being converted into a Municipal Council and then into a Municipal Corporation -- None of the above mandatory provisions of the Constitution as well as the 1973 Act and the 1994 Act have been followed – Notifications are held to be in clear cut contravention of 73rd and 74th amendment of the Constitution – Notifications quashed. V.K. Kapoor and others v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 524 (P&H DB).

Criminal case

Appointment of Lambardar – Summoning in a criminal complaint for a cognizable offence in which the police did not take any action cannot be considered to be an incident serious enough to ignore the claim -- If any conviction is recorded, the revenue authorities would surely take into account the said fact. Ran Singh v. State of Punjab & others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 157 (P&H).

Dismissal of Lambardar – Acquittal in appeal – Effect of -- A person involved in a case u/s 302 IPC cannot command any respect from public as, surely, the public cannot have confidence and rely on him -- Surely, a person who has been tried for an offence as serious as u/s 302 IPC, cannot serve the purpose of the post held by him as he would be looked upon with suspicion -- Order, dismissing the Lambardar, was not required to be reviewed, even though he has been acquitted. Dharam Pal v. Financial Commissioner, Haryana & others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 418 (P&H).

Suspension of Panch/Sarpanch -- It is not for the authorities under the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, to give an opinion on the merit of the criminal case, registered against the person –Registration of case involving serious offences, itself is a ground for suspension of Panch/Sarpanch -- Once it is not disputed that the petitioner was facing trial under Sections 307, 324, 341 and 348 IPC, no error has been committed by the authorities in suspending the petitioner in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 20(3) of the Act. Tejbalkar Singh v. State of Punjab and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 181 (P&H).

Co-owner

Adverse possession – Defendant being co-sharer, could not become owner of the disputed shop by adverse possession unless ouster of the plaintiff was proved. Chander Bhan and others v. Gobind Lal and another, 2011(1) L.A.R. 232 (P&H).

Contract

Interpretation of -- Contract is interpreted according to its purpose -- Purpose of a contract is the interests, objectives, values, policy that the contract is designed to actualize -- It comprises joint intent of the parties -- Every such contract expresses the autonomy of the contractual parties’ private will -- It creates reasonable, legally protected expectations between the parties and reliance on its results – Consistent with the character of purposive interpretation, the court is required to determine the ultimate purpose of a contract primarily by the joint intent of the parties at the time the contract so formed – It is not the intent of a single party; it is the joint intent of both parties and the joint intent of the parties is to be discovered from the entirety of the contract and the circumstances surrounding its formation. DLF Universal Ltd. & Another v. Director, T.&C. Planning Haryana & Others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 338 (SC).

Constitution of India

Article 14 -- Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4,6 – Acquisition of land – Release of land – Discrimination -- In the process of acquisition, more than half of the land has been ordered to be released from the acquisition, inspite of a very good case for the release of land in favour of the petitioners, their land was kept under acquisition -- Even the land of the petitioners, regarding which, change of land use certificate was granted way back in the year 2000, was also included in declaration issued u/s 6 of the Act -- As per Policy of the State Government, land regarding which such a certificate has been issued cannot be acquired -- Even that Policy was ignored in the case of the petitioners – Held, action taken by the authorities is in complete violation of the principles laid down under Article 14 of the Constitution -- Facts of the case indicate that the common man has been reduced virtually to a zero figure -- The State authorities have shown their utter disregard to the law -- Such an attitude cannot be tolerated – Petition allowed, notifications issued u/s 4 and declaration u/s 6 of the Act are quashed with costs of Rs.2,50,000/-. M/s Sindhu Education Foundation and others v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 454 (P&H DB).

Article 19(1)(c), 19(4) -- Society Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), Section 30 (As introduced by Haryana Act No. 14 of 2007) – Societies Registration (Haryana Amendment) Act, 2007 (Haryana Act No. 14 of 2007), Section 7 – Khadi and Village Industries Commission Act, 1956 (61 of 1956) -- Appointment of Administrator -- Vires of the Act – Challenge to – Contention that Article 19 (1) (c) confers all citizens the fundamental right to form associations or unions, however, under Article 19 (4), the said fundamental right is subject to the State making a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred and such law can be made by the State in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality – Accordingly contended that Haryana Amendment Act does not have any reasonable nexus with the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality and, therefore, the restrictions that have been imposed by the Amendment Act is ultra vires Article 19 (4) – Contention not tenable -- It is also difficult to appreciate as to how by enacting the Amendment Act the State Legislature can be understood to have encroached a field occupied by a Central Act, both the enactments operate in unconnected/different fields -- Challenge to vires of the provisions fails. Jagat Sarup and others v. The State of Haryana and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 389 (P&H DB).

Article 26,227 -- Northern India Canal & Drainage Act, 1873 (8 of 1873), Section 23,30-A, 30-B, 30-C – Change of outlet – Writ jurisdiction -- Ordinarily the authorities under the Act are best persons to assess the irrigation prospects and other circumvening circumstances before passing an order – Orders need to be interfered with only if the order is found to be arbitrary, perverse, without jurisdiction or passed for malafide reasons. Adeshvir Singh & another v. State of Punjab & others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 240 (P&H). 

Article 191, Tenth Schedule – Haryana Legislative Assembly (Disqualification of Members on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1986, Rule 7(3)(h) – Defection in party -- Petition before Speaker – Pendency of – Non-decisioning of -- Judicial review – Power of -- Five members of Haryana Janhit Congress (BL) defected to Congress – Petition before Speaker for their disqualification – Speaker gave as many as six opportunities to respondents to file replies over a period of about eight and half months – Speaker even after the filing of the writ petition wherein the prayer was for speedy decision-kept granting further time to respondents -- Held, the present is a case where judicial intervention is justified even during the trial of the petitions, and issue a direction to Speaker to decide the said petitions within a fixed time frame – Speaker is directed to finally decide the petitions in accordance with law, within a period of four months. Kuldeep Bishnoi v. Speaker, Haryana Vidhan Sabha and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 504 (P&H).

Article 191, Tenth Schedule – Petition before Speaker – Power of Judicial review -- Even though proceedings under Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule cannot be termed to be immune from judicial review, yet the Courts would enter this area with strict circumspection. Kuldeep Bishnoi v. Speaker, Haryana Vidhan Sabha and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 504 (P&H).

Article 226 – Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994 (19 of 1994), Section 74 – Nomination papers – Filing of – Non-acceptance of – Writ Jurisdiction -- State Election Commissioner in the report has mentioned that there is no conclusive evidence to establish that petitioners reached the office of Returning Officer in order to file their nomination papers – Held, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court ordinarily shall not examine disputed question of fact -- As to whether petitioners reached in time to file nomination papers is a question of fact, it can be examined in an election petition. Dalbir Kaur and others v. State of Punjab and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 489 (P&H).

Article 226, 227 -- Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4,6, 11, 11-A, 17 – Acquisition of land – Award – Challenge to – Delay in challenging -- Limitation -- Acquired land was utilized for implementing Residential Scheme -- In the process, the BDA not only incurred huge expenditure but also created third party rights -- Delay of nine years from the date of publication of the declaration issued u/s 6(1) and almost six years from the date of passing of award should have been treated by the High Court as more than sufficient for denying equitable relief. Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Moti Lal Agarwal and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 645 (SC).

Article 226, 227 -- Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 7 – Common Land – Encroachment upon – Eviction – Writ jurisdiction -- An old well had been installed wherefrom all the villagers drew water -- It was a Share-am plot meant for common purposes -- Petitioners were having a house adjoining to the area and, therefore, so as to encroach, they constructed a boundary wall over the said land -- Facts have been verified by way of demarcation report and a finding of fact against the petitioners has been recorded -- In extra ordinary writ jurisdiction, no indulgence can be shown, particularly because the land was being used for common purposes. Surajbhan and Another v. The Commissioner, Rohtak Division and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 245 (P&H).

Article 226, 227 -- Writ Court – Power of -- While deciding the writ petition, the High Court did not even consider the well reasoned judgments/orders by the authorities under the Statute -- Court was supposed to examine the correctness of those orders -- More so, the relevant record of the authority was not examined -- No reason, leave alone a cogent reason has been given by the High Court for the reversal of these orders -- High Court while deciding the case did not give opportunity to the authority to file a reply to the writ petition -- Court proceeded in haste and decided the case relying upon irrelevant materials -- Judgment and order of the High Court is set aside and the orders passed by the authorities under the statute are restored. Greater Mohali Area Development Authority & Anr. v. Manju Jain & Others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 147 (SC).

Article 226,227 -- Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15,16 – Appointment of Lambardar – Writ Jurisdiction -- Financial Commissioner and the Commissioner have taken into account the comparative merit of both the persons -- Petitioner is 49 years of age, appointed candidate is 28 years of age -- Both the candidates are matriculates -- In addition, appointed candidate has donated blood and is President of Guru Ravidas Mandir of the village and therefore, has been found to be serving the society – No reason to judicially review the well founded orders passed by the authorities. Raj Kumar v. Financial Commissioner, Haryana & others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 159 (P&H).

Article 243(Q), 73rd and 74th Amendment --  Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 (16 of 1994), Section 3, 413 – Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 (24 of 1973), Section 2-A -- Municipal Corporation – Declaration of – Gram Panchayat area – Inclusion of 42 Gram Panchayats to declare the Municipal Corporation is, in fact, against the intent of the Constitution itself -- Article 243 (Q) provides for transitional area i.e. from rural to urban area, therefore, the first step for taking the rural area into urban area is by constituting Nagar Panchayat -- State of Haryana, has defined urban area as Municipal Committee – For the purpose of 73rd as well as 74th amendment in the Constitution was to bring maximum participation of the people in the local self government by the rural or semi urban population -- State instead of decentralizing the powers is amalgamating the same in the hands of a few which body would certainly not take so close care which the smaller bodies were doing -- The purpose to introduce the 73rd and 74th amendment was that once the village attains the character which is more urban in nature then the said rural area is to be put in to transitional area i.e. in the present case as a Municipal Committee and the urban character of the said rural area is to be seen from last preceding census wherein non agricultural activities, revenue generated in the local administration etc. are determined -- It is only after a period and after seeing the population of that particular area on the basis of last preceding census that the transitional area is given the second step of being converted into a Municipal Council and then into a Municipal Corporation -- None of the above mandatory provisions of the Constitution as well as the 1973 Act and the 1994 Act have been followed – Notifications are held to be in clear cut contravention of 73rd and 74th amendment of the Constitution – Notifications quashed. V.K. Kapoor and others v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 524 (P&H DB).

Article 243(U) -- Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 (16 of 1994), Section 3 – Municipal Corporation -- Declaration of -- In the absence of assessment by the authorities, regarding the involvement of 60% of the population of the area in non agricultural activities, such an area could not be added in the Municipal Corporation. V.K. Kapoor and others v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 524 (P&H DB).

Article 246(Q) -- Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 (16 of 1994), Section 3 -- Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 (24 of 1973), Section 2-A -- Municipal Corporation -- Declaration of -- Notification issued to declare the Panchkula Municipal Council as Municipal Corporation after merging Municipal Committees of Pinjore and Kalka and certain villages – (a) The State Government before issuing such notification did not call for any objection by the individuals, councils, institutions or societies of the area or Panchayats or Municipal Committees, (b) Nothing was mentioned; if the cantonment area or the forest area was excluded from its operation. The Municipal Councils were not consulted for altering or adding the area within their respective municipal limits. (c) No draft notification was issued and two notifications by the State Government and the Governor were, directly issued for creation and declaring the Municipal Corporation consisting of the area as referred to in the notification, (d) Though, the area of Gram Panchayats was added, yet, no specific notification for dissolving of the gram panchayats was issued. (e) The notification issued by the Governor of Haryana does not record his subjective satisfaction as to whether it satisfied the guidelines issued by the Government and is in consonance with the provisions of Haryana Municipal Act, 1973, Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 and Article 246(Q) of the Constitution – Held, to declare certain municipal area as 'Municipal Corporation' is the legislative act, however, no such act could be done in contravention of the laws of the State and procedure as laid down under Section 2-A of the 1973 Act as well as Section 3 (2)(3) of the 1994 Act -- The legislature never intended to give a go bye these provisions while creating a Municipal Corporation by upgrading Municipal Committee and Municipal Council – Notifications are in clear cut contravention of 73rd and 74th amendment of the Constitution so also the guidelines as well as the aforesaid provisions of the 1973 Act and the 1994 Act, therefore, the same are quashed. V.K. Kapoor and others v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 524 (P&H DB).

Article 300-A – Land Acquisition act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4,6 – Acquisition of land – Rehabilitation of owners – Requirement of -- Article 300-A of the Constitution rests on the doctrine of eminent domain and guarantees a constitutional right against deprivation of property save by authority of law – It mandates that to be valid the deprivation of property must be by authority of law – Property has been acquired in terms of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which is a validly enacted piece of legislation – Neither Article 300-A of the Constitution nor the Land Acquisition Act make any measures for rehabilitation of the expropriated owners a condition precedent for compulsory acquisition of land -- In the absence of any such obligation arising either under Article 300-A or under any other statutory provision, rehabilitation of the owners cannot be treated as an essential requirement for a valid acquisition of property. Amarjit Singh & Ors. V. State of Punjab & Ors, 2011(1) L.A.R. 470 (SC).

Preamble -- Duties of Public Officers -- All officers of the State are getting powers under the Constitution, its Preamble starts with the words “We, the people of India” and Preamble ends with the words “adopt, enact and give to ourselves this Constitution” -- It is a common man’s power, which runs throughout, from page one to the end of the Constitution -- As per the Constitution, the officers of the State are supposed to act as a guardian of the general public and not as its detractors. M/s Sindhu Education Foundation and others v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 454 (P&H DB).

Consolidation proceedings

Path -- When consolidation scheme was framed, path was not provided to connect the land of respondents – Held, path cannot be denied to connect the land owned by a person, as the land would be rendered useless, it cannot be put to agricultural or other use if it is not connected to the road. Jagdish and another v. The Director Consolidation Haryana and Others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 624 (P&H).

Consent Decree

Challenge to – Consent decree is effective in the same manner as decree after contest -- Consent decree does not stand on different footing than the decree rendered after contest -- Plaintiffs would not get any right to challenge it in absence of fraud. Sher Singh and another v. Siri Kishan and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 443 (P&H).

Challenge to -- Merely because defendants were blind, could not lead to a conclusion that the decree was outcome of fraud, once, it was proved that they had signed the written statement and also suffered statement in the Court. Sher Singh and another v. Siri Kishan and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 443 (P&H).

Transfer of Title – Once, there was a decree, vide which the title was passed on to the defendant, the plaintiff could not claim title unless the decree was set aside. Sher Singh and another v. Siri Kishan and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 443 (P&H).

Conduct of candidate

Appointment of Lambardar – Petitioner is residing in other village -- Petitioner has got prepared his ration card and voter list in both villages which puts question mark on his trustworthiness – District Collector rightly ignored the petitioner – Collector’s order confirmed by Commissioner -- No illegality/irregularity or any perversity in the order of lower revenue Courts. Sukhdev Raj v. Ranjit Singh, 2011(1) L.A.R. 84 (FC Pb.).

Condonation of delay

Application for bringing on record the Legal representative of the appellant – Explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay -- Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court -- In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution -- Statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation for bringing the legal representatives on record, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay -- Applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner -- An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay in the filing of such applications. Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh & Others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 325 (SC).

Delay of 778 days in Application for bringing on record the Legal representative of the appellant -- Except for a vague averment that the legal representatives were not aware of the pendency of the appeal before the Court, there is no other justifiable reason stated in the one page application -- No reason or sufficient cause shown as to what steps were taken during this period and why immediate steps were not taken by the applicant, even after they admittedly came to know of the pendency of the appeal before the Court -- It is the abnormal conduct on the part of the applicants, particularly son who had appeared in the trial and was fully aware of the proceedings, but still did not inform the counsel of the death of his father – No ‘sufficient cause’ for condonation of delay of 778 days in filing the application. Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh & Others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 325 (SC).

Punjab Rent Act -- Leave to defend – Limitation – Tenant is required to appear before the Controller and apply for leave to contest the same within 15 days of service of the summons -- Rent Controller being a creature of statute can only act in terms of the powers vested in him by statute and cannot, therefore, entertain an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay since the statute does not vest him with such power. Om Prakash v. Ashwani Kumar Bassi, 2011(1) L.A.R. 109 (SC).

Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994 -- Election petition – Even if the writ petition has been dismissed with liberty to file election petition even than granting of liberty to file election petition does not amount to condonation of delay -- In any case, the election petition is to be treated and tried like a civil suit to which provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply for the purposes of extending the period of limitation. Gurvinder Singh v. Presiding Officer, Election Tribunal (SDM),Dhuri and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 167 (P&H).

Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994 -- Election petition has to be filed within 45 days from the date of election of the returned candidate and there is no scope for any extension of time -- If the election petition is not filed within period of limitation, then there is no alternative with the Election Tribunal but to dismiss the election petition. Major Singh v. Presiding Officer, Election Tribunal (A.D.C). Sangrur and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 174 (P&H).

Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994 -- Limitation – Election petition was required to be filed within 45 days -- Limitation cannot be extended in any manner. Suresh Kumar v. Sham Lal and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 100 (P&H).

Special Leave petition – Acquisition of the land by the DDA -- Neither the Land Acquisition Collector nor the Reference Court gave opportunity to the DDA to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation -- High Court did not issue notice to the DDA apparently because it was not a party to the proceedings -- Notwithstanding this, the DDA has been asked to release Rs.14 crores and odd for payment of compensation to the respondents -- Permission to file the special leave petitions granted to DDA – Delay of 372 days condoned. Delhi Development Authority v. Bhola Nath Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 590 (SC).

Comparative merits

Appointment of Lambardar – Appellate Authority’s Jurisdiction -- Collector appointed candidate who is substantially younger in age, being 40 years of age, whereas the petitioner is 52 years of age – Land holding is also 39 kanals 9 marlas in the village as against the 25 kanals of the petitioner – Appointed candidate also has experience as Sarbrah Lambardar, being nephew of the deceased Lambardar – The other criteria’s are by and large comparable -- Discretion exercised by the District Collector in the matter of appointment of Lambardar has to be accepted, in case it does not suffer from arbitrariness or perverse exercise of power – Held, the District Collector has taken into account the relevant merit factors, the Commissioner, while exercising appellate jurisdiction, committed an illegality in interfering with the same. Ranjit Singh v. Financial Commissioner, Animal Husbandary, Punjab & Ors., 2011(1) L.A.R. 309 (P&H).

Appointment of Lambardar – Speaking order – Collector passed the order for appointment of Lambardar, however particulars of the other candidate not taken into consideration while making appointment – Comparative merits of both the candidates not considered – Financial Commissioner remanded the case back to Collector – No legal flaw in the order of Financial Commissioner. Het Ram v. Financial Commissioner, Haryana & others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 308 (P&H).

Commercial building

Punjab Rent Act -- Retired employee -- Bonafide need –Petition was filed u/s 13-A, yet, the trial of the case proceeded as if it was a petition u/s 13 – Contention that the petition having been styled u/s 13-A could have only been answered qua the premises which were residential in nature – Now there is no distinction between residential and commercial premises in so far as the bona fide need of a landlord is concerned -- If the respondent wanted to get the demised premises vacated and that too in the evening of his life, it can hardly be said that need was not bona fide. Dr. Madan Lal v. Rattan Singh, 2011(1) L.A.R. 115 (P&H).

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908)

Order 1 Rule 10 – Necessary party -- For seeking impleadment in any pending litigation, applicant has to prove that he has interest in the lis and his valuable rights are involved in the lis or without his presence lis can not be decided effectively. Kartar Chand v. Financial Commissioner, Appeal, Punjab and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 127 (P&H).

Order 6 Rule 17 – East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13-B, 18-A -- NRI landlord – Leave to defend -- Amendment in pleadings -- Tenant has not averred in the application for amendment as to when he came to know about the fact which he wanted to incorporate in his application under Section 18-A of the Act -- In the absence of the material particulars about the time when the petitioner allegedly came to know about the alleged subsequent event -- Amendment is wholly frivolous and has been rightly declined by the Rent Controller. Anil Kumar Sharma v. Barjinder Singh Mann, 2011(1) L.A.R. 620 (P&H).

Order 9 Rule 3,4 – Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994 (19 of 1994), Section 81 – Punjab Nagar Palika Election Rules, 1994 -- Election petition – Dismissed in default – Restoration of – Application signed by Advocate – Maintainability of -- If the application for restoration is not signed by the appellant but it is signed by his Advocate, then that will be sufficient because an Advocate is an authorized agent of the party and is also authorized under the power of attorney in his favour to sign the applications. Sukhpreet Singh v. Jatinder Kumar and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 662 (P&H).

Order 9 Rule 3,4, Order 19 Rule 1 – Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994 (19 of 1994), Section 81 – Punjab Nagar Palika Election Rules, 1994 -- Rules and Orders of Punjab and Haryana High Court, Volume 1, Chapter 14, Part E, Rule 11  -- Election petition – Dismissed in default – Restoration of – Neither the CPC nor the Rules and Orders of Punjab and Haryana High Court provides for filing of affidavit in support of an application for restoration of the suit/election petition which has been dismissed in default, yet under Order 19 Rule 1 of the CPC, the Court can always demand an affidavit and if despite the order of the Court the affidavit is not filed, then the said application deserves rejection. Sukhpreet Singh v. Jatinder Kumar and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 662 (P&H).

Order 22 Rule 2 and 9 -- Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 (11 of 1973), Section 13 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Application for bringing on record the Legal representative of the appellant – Condonation of delay -- Explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay -- Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court -- In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution -- Statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation for bringing the legal representatives on record, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay -- Applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner -- An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay in the filing of such applications. Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh & Others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 325 (SC).

Order 22 Rule 2 and 9 -- Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 (11 of 1973), Section 13 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Appeal by landlord before Supreme Court – Sole Proprietor died during the pendency of the appeal -- Application for bringing on record the Legal representative of the appellant after delay of 778 days -- Condonation of delay -- Except for a vague averment that the legal representatives were not aware of the pendency of the appeal before the Court, there is no other justifiable reason stated in the one page application -- No reason or sufficient cause shown as to what steps were taken during this period and why immediate steps were not taken by the applicant, even after they admittedly came to know of the pendency of the appeal before the Court -- It is the abnormal conduct on the part of the applicants, particularly son who had appeared in the trial and was fully aware of the proceedings, but still did not inform the counsel of the death of his father – No ‘sufficient cause’ for condonation of delay of 778 days in filing the application. Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh & Others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 325 (SC).

Section 100 – Second Appeal – Power of -- High Court cannot interfere with the findings of learned lower first appellate court on facts but when the findings are the outcome of misreading of document, and perverse, being contrary to the settled law then the High Court under section 100 of the Code can always interfere, as interpretation of a document is a question of law. Smt.Gejo (dead) through LRs. v. Kanwar Raj Singh (dead) through LRs. & Others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 257 (P&H).

Section 107, Order 41 Rule 27(1)(b) -- Additional evidence – Rule 27(1)(b) empowers the Appellate Court to give permission for additional evidence if the Court itself requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined for the purpose of its assistance for coming to a just conclusion and for any other substantial cause -- Substantial cause though has not been defined, therefore, it depends upon facts and circumstances of each case -- Even if the documents, namely, jamabandis were within knowledge of the appellants, the Court can always allow it in terms of Order 41 Rule 27(1) (b) of the CPC – Documentary evidence which cannot be created or manufactured for the first time after the decision of the suit i.e. any official document whose authenticity is not in dispute and is capable of assisting the Court to take final decision in respect of the dispute between the parties, such evidence should not normally be disallowed to be taken on record. Gurdial Singh and others v. Mam Chand and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 579 (P&H).

Clubbing of Khewats

Partition of land – Partition of land by clubbing three different Khewats, where the co-­sharers are different, is not good order as per law. Amin Chand v. Karam Chand and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 371 (FC Pb.).

Civil Court Decree

Suit challenging civil court decree – Limitation -- Limitation to challenge the decree passed by the civil Court is three years, from the date of passing of decree, or in the alternative from the date of knowledge. Sher Singh and another v. Siri Kishan and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 443 (P&H).

Choice of Collector

Choice of Collector

Appointment of Lambardar – After considering the merits of the candidates, the Collector appointed the Lambardar -- Commissioner accepted the appeal in abject disregard to the limits of his jurisdiction as an appellate court and proceeded to reverse the order passed by the Collector by imposing his perception of the better candidate – Commissioner lost sight of a fundamental principle that governs selection of a Lambardar namely; that the choice of the Collector is final, except where it is palpably perverse, arbitrary, preposterous or contrary to the rules -- Financial Commissioner rightly restored the order passed by the Collector Kulwinder Singh v. Financial Commissioner (Appeals-II), Punjab and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 201 (P&H).

Appointment of Lambardar – As the Collector granted the benefit of hereditary claim to the petitioner and ignored the better qualifications of respondent, the Commissioner rightly set aside the appointment of the petitioner and appointed respondent as the Lambardar. Satish Kumar v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 607 (P&H).

Appointment of Lambardar -- Exercise of discretion by the Collector is always preferred – High Court cannot sit as a Court of appeal over the view expressed by the departmental authorities. Ruldu Singh v. Financial Commissioner (Revenue), Punjab and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 82 (P&H DB).

Appointment of Lambardar -- It is an accepted practice in lambardari cases that other things being equal, the choice of the District Collector has to be respected unless and until there was something patently wrong with the order. Rajinder Singh v. Pipal Singh, 2011(1) L.A.R. 88 (FC Pb.).

Appointment of Lambardar – Where the choice of the Collector is perverse, arbitrary or violative of any rule, it cannot be final and may, circumstances so permitting be rectified by appellate or revisional authorities. Satish Kumar v. State of Haryana and others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 607 (P&H).

Character of the candidate

Appointment of Lambardar – Petitioner, being son of former-deceased Lambardar did not, for more than 30 years, inform the authorities about the death of his father, rather, he undertook to collect the land revenue, etc., without any authority from the competent authority – Petitioner is 70 years old – A person like the petitioner, if allowed to be appointed as Lambardar, would not make a good choice. Bhajan Singh v. State of Punjab & Others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 422 (P&H).

Change of outlet

Water course – Authorities found that better irrigation cannot be provided to the added land of the petitioners if the area is transferred -- Claim of the petitioners has been found to be not in the interest of better irrigation, and rather, if allowed, it would adversely effect the irrigation of land of other share holders of chak -- No jurisdictional error can be traced in the orders. Adeshvir Singh & another v. State of Punjab & others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 240 (P&H).

Water course – Writ jurisdiction -- Ordinarily the authorities under the Act are best persons to assess the irrigation prospects and other circumvening circumstances before passing an order – Orders need to be interfered with only if the order is found to be arbitrary, perverse, without jurisdiction or passed for malafide reasons. Adeshvir Singh & another v. State of Punjab & others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 240 (P&H). 

Change of chak

Water course – Judicial Review -- Authorities while dealing with the issue has clarified that no adverse effect would be caused to irrigation to the land of the petitioners because the size of outlet would be adjusted proportionately – From the existing source, the irrigation to the land of respondent-party has been negligible, by change he would get irrigation -- No ground for judicial review of the orders passed by the authorities. Nazar Singh & others v. Divisional Canal Officer, Rori Water Services Division, Sirsa & others, 2011(1) L.A.R. 229 (P&H).